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The Gen Z Movement and Its Implications for the Secular, Democratic, Federal Republic of Nepal

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Abstract

In early September 2025, Nepal witnessed unprecedented youth led movement triggered by social media ban. What began as a protest against the government's decision to ban nearly 26 social media applications an action justified as an attempt to regulate these platforms following an order of Supreme Court, was widely perceived as an effort to suppress young voices. On the morning of September 8, young people—primarily from Gen Z—took to the streets carrying the national flag of Nepal along with banners reading Youth against Corruption and Freedom of Expression is a Fundamental Right (Petersen, 2025) (Salliq & Shreshtha, 2025). While this movement initially seemed likely to remain confined to the Kathmandu Valley, but it soon spread to major towns across Himalayan region and hill population dominated areas of Madhes . The government's social media ban appeared to have backfired as within hours the streets of Kathmandu were full with massive crowds. The movement was largely believed to be initiated and spearheaded by the Gen Z . It ultimately led to the resignation of the entire government of KP Sharma Oli after deadly clashes in which more than 74 young people were killed by 9th of September 2025. An interim government was subsequently installed with mandate of holding parliamentary elections within six months. Under the Shushila Karki Government, the parliamentary elections were held on March 5, which appears to have brought about a seismic sift in the country's political landscape.

The contemporary moment can be looked at as one in which youth across the wold are protesting against political systems perceived as corrupt, that favour the rich, and are not able to promise them a decent future. Even then the protests happening in the developing economies of South Asia have their own specificities due to their unique postcolonial trajectories. This article argues that while the Gen Z movement in Nepal was primarily against corruption and elite capture of power, but its organizational fluidity, ideological diffuseness, leaderlesness may have inadvertently effect on the fragile and deeply contested political landscape of the country. This paper intends to focus particularly on the Gen Z movement's possible consequences for secularism, democracy and federalism in Nepal.

This paper adopts a qualitative and interpretative approach. It draws upon analysis of media reports, digital mobilization patterns to the September 2025 gen z movement in Nepal. This study employs contextual political analysis to situate the movement within Nepal's historical trajectory of democratic mobilization and constitutional transformation. By analysing data, the article seeks to provide a theoretically informed assessment of the movement's implications for secularism, federalism and republican democracy in Nepal.

Keywords: *Corruption, Democracy, Gen Z, KP Sharma Oli, Nepal, Monarchy, Social Media.*

Introduction

Nepal has witnessed a long history of political and social upheavals. Nepal's recent Gen Z movement must be read as both continuation and rupture in a long history of popular mobilizations. To understand what happened on September 8 and 9, it is necessary to examine the interplay between structural grievances such as economic stagnation, youth unemployment, concentrated privilege and corruption and a shift in modes of organization and expression characteristic of a globally connected generation. The movement's rapid escalation on 8th of September 2025 was catalyzed by a government action widely perceived as an attempt to silence public scrutiny—the temporary shutdown or attempted ban of major social media platforms—and by viral exposures of elite nepotism and ostentatious wealth. Those twin sparks lit tinder that had been laid over decades: a sense among large swathes of Nepal's young people that formal politics and existing political institutions had increasingly failed to secure dignity, opportunity, and accountability. Reports from major media outlets shows how the protests began online and spilled onto streets in cities and towns, drawing thousands, provoking violent clashes with security forces, and producing a crisis that led to the resignation of the home minister and prime minister in the immediate aftermath (KathmanduPost, 2025) (Petersen, Hannah Ellis; Pokharel, Gaurav, 2025). The generation (Gen Z) that is often dismissed as narcissistic, politically disengaged, living in a virtual world, and addicted to mobile phones has compelled South Asia's only so-called communist government to its knees. Tragically, this upheaval resulted in the deaths of nearly 19 young people in police firing and related violence—a figure that has now risen to more than 74 (Annapurnaexpress, 2025). Through mediation of army chief Ashok Raj Sigdel and the political acumen of the President, Ramchandra Paudel, an interim government was formed under the leadership of Nepal's former Chief Justice and a prominent voice against corruption in Nepal, Mrs. Sushila Karki. This government was mandated to conduct mid-term parliamentary elections within six months—by March 5, 2026—and subsequently hand over power to a duly elected administration (Risingnepal, 2025). Prior to this development, the foremost choice of Gen Z youths for leadership was Kathmandu's rapper-turned-mayor, Balen Shah, who has emerged as a symbol of administrative competence and change, advocating a policy of zero tolerance against corruption. When Balen Shah refused to lead the interim government, the youth—using the Discord app as a platform for voting—chose Sushila Karki as their leader.

This article proceeds in the following parts. First, it situates the movement within Nepal's longer history of political mobilizations. Second it examines the socio-economic and digital conditions shaping the protest. Third, the paper attempts to analyse the possible implications for secularism, federalism and republican democracy. Fourth, it sheds lights on the current election's scenario of Nepal. And finally offers concluding remarks.

The first pro-democracy movement (Jana Andolan I) in 1990, ended absolute monarchy and ushered in a constitutional monarchy with multi-party democracy. The Maoist insurgency (1996–2006) was a far more violent and protracted challenge to the state that culminated in second People's Movement (Jana Andolan II) that led to the abolition of monarchy in 2008 and started the phase of transition toward a republican constitution that got adopted in 2015. This constitution itself triggered protests—especially in the Madhes region and among marginalized groups—over questions of inclusion, federalism and citizenship. These cycles show that Nepalese political life has long been shaped by waves of democratic mobilizations that attempt to deepen the understanding of who counts as "the people," and endeavours to create a system in which rule of law and constitutionalism prevails, and the identity and rights of the diverse population are recognized. The Gen Z movement is the newest wave, but it differs in crucial ways: its leadership is more fluid and decentralized, its communications are digitally organized.

The social composition of the movement is revealing. Generation Z in Nepal, has a distinct biographical relation to the post-2008 order and the digital era. Many participants were born into the new republic and came of age after the tumult of the Maoist war. They have high exposure to global cultural flows via smartphones, diaspora networks, and social platforms. Also, they inhabited an economy in which formal jobs are scarce, remittances dominate GDP, and many young people consider migration as a primary life

strategy. Studies and regional analyses (Khan, 2025) (Pant & Shekhawat, 2025) (KC, 2025) (eKantipur, 2024) have emphasized the acute economic frustrations of Nepalese youth—youth unemployment rate and dependency on remittances, for instance, have been persistent sources of vulnerability—so the emotional register of the movement is not merely political indignation but also existential anxiety about futures. This material substrate helps explain why images of "nepo kids" or political scions flaunting luxury can provoke such fury: they are not abstract symbols but living embodiments of a system that appears to reward lineage and patronage over merit and effort. The movement therefore mixes classical anti-corruption demands with a traditional denunciation of elite excess.

Digital technologies have shaped not only the speed of diffusion but also the grammar of protest. Participants used social media platforms to expose wrongdoing, and coordinate logistics. The government's attempt to ban social media—presented as a regulatory move but read by many youths as a political gag—was therefore both tactically unwise and symbolically explosive: cutting off the platforms meant cutting off the very infrastructure through which a generation had formed common grievances. The social-media trigger is important because it shows the changing locus of political socialization: where older generations-built associations in schools, student unions, or parties, many Gen Z organize in digital-first spaces. Nepal is a low-income country where social media appears to function not only as a means of social connection, but also as an important way to stay in touch with family members working abroad. It also seems to provide young people with information and networks that may help them explore employment opportunities overseas. At the same time, for many people living within Nepal, platforms such as YouTube and other social media channels have emerged as possible sources of income. In this context, social media and YouTube may not be understood only in terms of the right to freedom of expression. They can also be viewed as tools connected to livelihood and economic survival. Therefore, any restriction on these platforms might have wider socio-economic implications, which have contributed to triggering the movement.

This movement was not primarily directed against a particular government with the immediate aim of toppling it. At first glance, it appeared to emerge from a specific and immediate trigger. However, deeper analysis demonstrates that its roots lay in Nepal's worsening economic conditions, the perceived lack of governmental accountability, and a growing frustration with the state's tendency to ignore or suppress public voices. According to World Bank data, Nepal is facing an unemployment rate of approximately 20.5 percent among youth, which is reported to be among the highest in South Asia. Nearly one-third of the country's GDP is estimated to come from remittances sent by Nepalis living and working abroad. Furthermore, data from the Department of Foreign Employment office of Nepal indicate that around 1,500 people leave Nepal each day in search of employment overseas. The above discussion therefore suggests that the Gen Z movement is rooted in economic frustration, declining trust in institutions, and digitally driven forms of mobilization. It reflects both a strong desire for accountability and a deep dissatisfaction with established political actors.

However, in transitional democracies such as Nepal, popular movements rarely remain limited to their immediate demands; they often influence the wider political and social system. This is especially important in Nepal, where secularism, federalism, and republican democracy are relatively recent constitutional arrangements and continue to be debated. In this context, the political uncertainty created by the current upheaval might have consequences that go beyond a change in leadership or government. The following sections therefore examine how this movement could affect the core pillars of Nepal's post-2015 constitutional framework: secularism, federalism, and republican democracy.

Implications for Secularism

Until 2006, Nepal was considered as world's only Hindu kingdom. Nepal's shift from Hindu state to secular republic was hard-won and constitutionally entrenched, but it has never been uncontested. Forces pushing for a return to a more prominent role for religion in public life—often framed in nationalist or monarchist terms—still have their constituencies. The new youth mobilization, by contrast, has tended to articulate pluralist and anti-authoritarian norms rather than religio-nationalist restoration. But by the evening of the 9th September, a

series of developments raised serious questions about the future of secular republic of Nepal. Durga Prasai, a controversial medical trader and polarising figure, formerly a member of the CPN-UML (BBC, 2023), later aligned with the pro-monarchy camp, and has been repeatedly involved in organizing pro-monarchy movements in Nepal (Karki, 2082 VS) (Adhikari, 2023). The major pro-monarchy demonstrations held in the March 2025 were widely attributed to his leadership. Currently, he has been making concerted efforts for the restoration of the Hindu monarchy in Nepal (eKantipur, 2025). When Prasai met with the army chief, Ashok Raj Sigdel, doubts about the survival of secular republican order in Nepal deepened further, partly because the ongoing Gen Z movement appears disorganized, leaderless, and ideologically diffuse making it more vulnerable to being co-opted or diverted. Several media reports have claimed that a majority of protesters favor monarchy and the Hindu state, though prominent faces of the movement such as Sudhan Gurung have insisted that their primary objective is to establish a civilian government. He claims that the army chief was merely playing the part of a mediator, and the protesters would negotiate only with the President (NepalKhabar, 2025) (Kharel, 2025). News also circulated that the army chief had asked the President to resign, but the President refused, stating that he was ready to make sacrifices but would not step down. Had the President resigned under military pressure, it is likely that the resulting political vacuum would have been exploited by pro-monarchy forces and by disposed king Gyanendra Shah, who might have sought to return to the throne, precisely with this objective, observers suggest, that Durga Prasai met with the army chief.

It is noteworthy that the movement was not primarily motivated by any religious orientation. Therefore, it would be analytically premature to interpret the movement as inherently anti secular. Most of its participants belonged to a generation born in republican Nepal, and their objective was to hold the government accountable to constitutional principles and fundamental rights. Their demands were framed largely in terms of governance, transparency, and responsiveness rather than identity or religion.

However, the developments discussed above suggest that, at certain moments, royalist actors attempted to utilise the immediate political vacuum created by this uprising to reassert their relevance. While the movement itself did not advocate a return to monarchy or a Hindu state, prolonged political instability, declining public trust in political institutions, and the inability of the political system to respond effectively to popular expectations of people might create openings for such forces. In contexts where governments are perceived as unresponsive or ineffective, alternative political narratives—particularly those critical of secular democratic arrangements—could gain traction in Nepal. Therefore, the longer such instability persists, and the weaker public confidence in constitutional governance becomes, the greater the possibility that actors skeptical of Nepal's secular democratic framework could attempt to use these conditions to advance their own agendas.

Implications for federalism

One of the main demands of the Gen Z movement increasingly emerged, was the establishment of a directly elected executive and the abolition of the so called costly and allegedly unnecessary for Nepal's conditions-the provincial system (Maharjan, 2025). As this movement was mainly concentrated in the hill cities where opposition of federalism is increasingly much higher among the urban population. It is obvious that the distrust generated by the movement was translated into an alleged call for the abolition of federalism.

It is equally important to note that Nepal has for the most part remained under a Kathmandu-centric unitary system (Smith & Smith, 2023), dominated by and mostly serving the interests of the Bahun–Chhetri nexus. During constitution drafting, one of the main controversial issues was federalism, which for the Madhesis who constitute 32 percent of Nepal's population and reside mainly in the Terai region—was regarded as a means to secure political rights. Madhesi parties stood firmly in favor of a federal Nepal, while the hill-centric parties could not have unanimous consensus (Shakya, 2015), fearing that in the future their political and administrative dominance would be challenged. Yet, due to political compulsion, excluding the royalist Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP manifesto, 2017, 2022), (Jha, 2023), all parties eventually accepted the federal arrangement. Mostly hill nationalists, view federalism as a challenge to their administrative and

political dominance and therefore advocate a unitary Nepal, while support among Madhesi parties for federalism continues to grow stronger even as opposition to it deepens within hill-centric political forces, with the Maoist party going so far as to advocate a directly elected executive, and the Rastriya Swatantra Party, which emerged in the 2022 elections (Shreshtha, 2022), refusing to participate in provincial elections, stating that federalism was expensive, unsuitable for Nepal, and should be abolished altogether.

During the Gen Z movement, it is important to note that within Kathmandu-centric elite circles, federalism has often been portrayed as unnecessary and financially burdensome for the country. This perception was also reflected during the protests, where some participants were seen demanding the rejection of the federal system. It was even reported that when interim Prime Minister Sushila Karki met an injured Gen Z youth, remarks were made suggesting that federalism was unsuitable for Nepal and should be discarded. However, such views largely reflect the perspective of segments of the Kathmandu-based elite rather than the entirety of Nepali society. Public opinion on federalism in Nepal remains divided. For Madhesi communities, federalism represents an important tool for securing administrative autonomy, political representation, and meaningful inclusion within the Nepali state structure. In this context, any negative or abrupt changes to the federal arrangement could risk generating internal unrest in the country. Although anti-federal sentiments were audible within sections of the Gen Z movement, it is important to recognize that federalism in Nepal is not merely an administrative arrangement but also a framework designed to manage diversity and preserve national integrity. Critics of federalism argues that it has contributed to corruption and increased public expenditure. While such concerns may partly reflect governance challenges, they point more to weaknesses in implementation rather than to the inherent failure of the federal model itself. Therefore, before any fundamental restructuring is considered, it would be prudent to foster a serious and inclusive national debate—one that meaningfully incorporates voices from the Terai region and other peripheral tribal and ethnic regions. A careful and participatory deliberative process would be essential to ensure that decisions regarding federalism strengthen, rather than destabilize, Nepal's democratic and constitutional order.

After the March 5 midterm elections, the RSP government, aligned with pro–Gen Z forces, has come to power. Its stance on federalism is highly ambiguous, confusing, and unclear, as it seeks to introduce changes in the present federal structure due to its dissatisfaction with the existing federal framework. At the same time, Madhesi parties have been completely wiped out in the House of Representatives, which has further increased the risk of weakening federalism. In such a situation, it is possible that Nepal may move toward a more centralized, Kathmandu-centric political arrangement. This could put pressure on federal structures for reform or modification, particularly if efficiency is projected as a key policy objective. Consequently, this may lead to greater consolidation of power within the capital and among established elite networks. Such developments could have significant implications for Madhesi communities, many of whom view federalism as an essential framework for ensuring political representation and administrative autonomy. Any substantial rollback of federal provisions may be perceived as a setback to their long-standing aspirations for meaningful participation and self-governance. While the exact trajectory will depend on policy choices and institutional negotiations, a rapid process of recentralization could narrow the space for inclusive representation and potentially affect the progress and welfare gains achieved through the federal restructuring process.

Implications for republican democracy

The implications of this movement for democracy are perhaps the most ambivalent and consequential. On one hand, it has challenged the troika of old leaders -Oli, Deuba and Prachanda-and paved the way for the younger generation to inter politics. On the other hand it has created a political vacuum, one that could potentially be exploited by forces that do not wish to see Nepal's infant democracy flourish, a republican democracy that is not even twenty years old. The impression is that a significant segment of Nepali youth appears to feel that the constitution of 2015 has not fully met their expectations. Pro-Hindu monarchy movements continue to emerge periodically across the country. Following the speech of the deposed King Gyanendra Shah on 19 March, titled "The Time Has Come" (*Ab Samay Aayo*), a pro-monarchy rally held on

28 March in Kathmandu drew widespread attention and tension among the people (Aryal & Pulami, 2025). Earlier, on 9 March, when the former king arrived at Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu from Pokhara, the lake city of Nepal, a large crowd led by Durga Prasai, a controversial figure, had gathered to welcome him. Questions arose as to whether the monarchy could once again be restored in Nepal, and why the new generation of the twenty-first century was chanting slogans in support of the king. The possible reasons may include the fact that the roots of democracy in Nepal are not yet institutionalized, and democratic institutions remain weak and fragile. In the span of nearly sixteen years, twelve different governments have come and gone, resulting in chronic instability, stagnating development, and pervasive corruption. Both democratic institutions and leaders have increasingly failed to live up to the aspirations of the people, fostering deep-rooted mistrust in Nepal's political system. A segment of Nepali society believes that secularism has seized Nepal's Hindu identity and cultural heritage (Aryal & Pulami, 2025). The demand for the restoration of the monarchy is often justified on the grounds that during the king's rule, the country enjoyed political stability, and the religious-cultural identity was preserved.

The central concern of the movement was the perceived failure of the republican government to meet public expectations. Many of those who participated appeared to be ideologically unaligned; their primary objective was to make the incumbent government more accountable and to promote greater transparency within the political system. The protests were not directed at dismantling the republican framework itself but at demanding responsible governance within it. However, the developments that followed Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli's resignation suggest that the situation carried broader political risks. Had the emerging instability not been managed with relative prudence by the President and the Chief of the Army Staff, there was a possibility that royalist actors might have sought to capitalize on the uncertainty. Historically, royalist groups have often attempted to frame moments of republican instability as evidence of the system's inherent weakness, thereby advancing their own political narratives. The events that unfolded shortly after 9 December, including the politically strategic activities associated with figures such as Durga Prasai, appeared to reflect attempts to leverage the prevailing anxiety surrounding republican governance. Thus, while the movement itself was not royalist in orientation and was fundamentally aimed at democratic accountability, the political vacuum it generated created conditions in which royalist forces could potentially seek advantage.

Mid-term parliamentary elections

On March 5, parliamentary elections were held in Nepal, and their results represent what can be described as a seismic shift in the country's political landscape. A party less than four years old—the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)—under the leadership of rapper-turned-politician Balenra Shah Balen, defeated Nepal's established communist parties and the Nepali Congress to secure, for the first time in 35 years, a near two-thirds majority. Following the Gen Z movement, Kathmandu's mayor, Balendra Shah, steadily rose in popularity among the youth and later joined the RSP. The election results suggest an emerging ideological shift in Nepali politics, where traditionally dominant communist parties have been reduced to just 41 seats. Even four-time Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, widely regarded as a central figure of Nepal's left politics and associated with Jhapa, the Leningrad of Nepali left, suffered an electoral defeat. In contrast, the victory of the relatively neoliberal-leaning RSP signals a broader transformation in the country's ideological orientation.

These elections are significant in multiple respects. For the first time, voters appear to have engaged in issue-based voting, which enabled the RSP—riding on the mandate of the Gen Z movement—to secure such a decisive victory. The charisma of Balendra Shah and the visible "Balen wave," in the country, played a crucial role in pushing traditional parties to their historic lows. Even identity-based Madhesi parties failed to secure a single seat. In several Asian countries, youth-led movements have succeeded in toppling governments but have struggled to translate that momentum into forming governments—Sri Lanka and Bangladesh serve as prime examples. Nepal, however, has emerged as an exception, where a party

representing a relatively Gen Z mandate has managed to achieve a sweeping electoral victory and form the government.

Prior to the elections, it appeared that leaders like Oli and Prachanda were consolidating their positions, but the results indicate that they have reached a historic low point. On March 27, the new government was sworn in, with Balendra Shah assuming office as Prime Minister. At 35, he carries the weight of significant expectations from the younger generation. Issues such as unemployment, corruption, and ill-governance are central to public scrutiny. Upon taking office, the Balen-led government released a 100-point governance-focused agenda, addressing areas such as education, healthcare, service delivery, anti-corruption measures, and the formulation of a framework for constitutional amendments.

However, as discussed earlier, the outcomes of this movement may also give rise to conditions that could negatively impact Nepal's secular federal democratic republic. Such tendencies still cannot be ruled out. For instance, the manner in which the swearing-in ceremony was conducted—seemingly resembling a religious event—has raised questions about Nepal's secular character. A debate has emerged on how a country with such deep diversity can promote a singular cultural framework in this way. The government has also constituted a task force to recommend constitutional amendments, indicating its intent to revisit and possibly restructure existing federal arrangements. The current leadership appears dissatisfied with the existing federal framework and is inclined toward introducing changes. The absence of Madhesi parties in Parliament, combined with the RSP's ambiguous or critical stance on federalism, may place the future of federalism in Nepal at risk. This could potentially lead to a re-centralization of power in the hands of Kathmandu-based elites.

Beyond domestic politics, these election results also carry significant diplomatic and geopolitical implications. Balendra Shah's electoral success in Jhapa is particularly noteworthy. This region has seen considerable Chinese investment and lies close to the strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor between India and Bangladesh, thereby heightening its importance for India's security considerations. In recent years, the United States has expanded its influence in Nepal through NGOs, educational grants, and development assistance. Several members of the current government have been beneficiaries of such initiatives, suggesting that Western—or more specifically, neoliberal—ideological influences may shape policy decisions under the new administration. These elections signify not only a transformation in Nepal's political landscape but also the potential reconfiguration of its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, there is a need for careful observation, as certain prospective changes in Nepal's current political structure could risk undermining the gains achieved through previous democratic movements in the country.

Conclusion

The Gen Z movement holds particular significance for Nepal because the country is still undergoing a democratic transition. Its political institutions have not yet been fully institutionalized. In such a context, the movement not only questions the functioning of these institutions but also demands broader reforms and stronger political commitment toward them. Importantly, the movement was not primarily directed against the institutions themselves or against the republican system as such. Rather, it was a response to their unresponsiveness, lack of transparency, and limited accountability to the public.

Although the movement initially emerged in opposition to restrictions on fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, its deeper roots appear to lie in longstanding public frustration over corruption, high unemployment rate among youth, opacity in governance, the growing distance between political leaders and citizens, and the state's inability to deliver services in line with public expectations. Therefore, it may be argued that after these March 5 elections, issues such as corruption, job creation, good governance, and transparency should not only be addressed as immediate priorities but also be approached in a way that strengthens democratic institutions. This would require making institutions more accessible to citizens and focusing on their proper institutionalization. This paper emphasises that, otherwise, Nepal's current democratic, federal republican system could potentially face significant risks again in future.

Nepal stands at a critical juncture where no single political institution has yet secured complete and unquestioned public legitimacy. Debates over monarchy versus republic continue to persist. Questions are also repeatedly raised regarding Nepal's new secular identity, and the establishment of federalism in a relatively small country remains contested among certain sections of society. In this context, it seems necessary to foster an inclusive environment of public debate in which voices from all regions, communities, castes, social and ethnic groups are meaningfully represented. The resolution of these issues should not be confined solely to parliamentary procedures; rather, a broader societal dialogue appears more essential.

Constitutional reform may thus be considered an urgent need in contemporary Nepal. It is reasonable to hope that the outcome of these March 5 elections will contribute to strengthening democracy, fulfilling public aspirations, and reinforcing constitutional structures. After all, democracy seeks to ensure governance of and for the people, while the rule of law requires equal application to all individuals. However, if comprehensive reforms aligned with public expectations are not undertaken, there remains a possibility that those who seek to reverse or destabilize the current system may attempt to exploit public dissatisfaction. In such a scenario, Nepal's secular and federal republican system could face serious risks. It is therefore in Nepal's broader interest that democratic consolidation, rather than regression, becomes the path forward.

Notes:

[1] Madhes- Madhya Desh; Nepal's fertile Tarai plains region bordering India's UP & Bihar, is the home to nearly 32% population of Nepal.

[2] Various conspiracy theories have emerged regarding the possible involvement of internal and external actors in relation to this movement. Some commentators suggest that, because Oli had frequently articulated positions critical of India, Indian intelligence agencies may have had an interest in his removal. Others contend that certain Western states may also have been dissatisfied with Prime Minister Oli's recent foreign policy engagements. In particular, they point to his visit to China and his participation in an event marking the 80th anniversary of a China–Japan wartime commemoration as developments that may have generated unease in Western capitals, especially in the United States and the European Union.

Against the backdrop of ongoing strategic rivalry between the United States and China, such interpretations frame the episode as potentially shaped by broader geopolitical competition. Given India's close relations with Western countries, some narratives further characterize the developments as reflecting a coordinated India–Western effort to oust Oli. However, these claims remain largely speculative and form part of a wider discursive contestation surrounding the political crisis

[3] Recently, in Srilanka and Bangladesh, governments were ousted through youth led movements triggered by corruption, nepotism and political irregularities; similar kinds of movements have also taken place in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan occupied Jammu & Kashmir.

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